Honor and Judicial: Where to Draw the Line
Dublin Core
Title
Honor and Judicial: Where to Draw the Line
Subject
Student newspapers and periodicals
Description
A newspaper article about the problems with students brought before both the Honor Council and Judicial Court.
Creator
Mello, Michael A.
Source
Mello, Michael. “Honor and Judicial: Where to Draw the Line.” The Bullet, October 17, 1978.
Publisher
HIST 298, University of Mary Washington
Date
1978-10-17
Rights
The materials in this online collection are held by Special Collections, Simpson Library, University of Mary Washington and are available for educational use. For this purpose only, you may reproduce materials without prior permission on the condition that you provide attribution of the source.
Format
2 JPG
300 dpi
Language
English
Coverage
Fredericksburg, VA
Text Item Type Metadata
Text
There is, under the present system of adjudication at MWC, a problem with the scope of the Honor Code as it relates to the strictures of the judicial code. This problem arises when a certain type of case enters into the system: namely, when a student accused of committing a judicial offense is brought before Honor Council on charges of "lying" about that offense. The thesis of this article is that this variety of "lying" does not fall within the strictures of the Honor Code, and hence ought not to be taken to Honor Trial.
To try an individual for "lying" about whether or not they committed an infraction of the College rules is a denial of a fundamental judicial right: namely, the right to proclaim one's innocence in the face of an accusation. This right entails more than "pleading the fifth" and remaining silent in the face of charges. Surely all students, even though subsequently found guilty by the judicial system, are entitled to state their innocence. To believe otherwise is not only to deny a basic liberty; such as position also casts the entire concept of pleading "not guilty" in judicial court into a new light. For it implies that anyone who so pleads, and is subsequently found guilty by the court, is liable to charges of "lying" by originally pleading innocent. If it is a "lie" to tell another student that you are innocent of a judicial infraction when you are in fact guilty, does it not follow that you are equally guilty of "lying" when you do the same thing before the Judicial Court in the form of an "innocent" plea?
If this sounds absurd, that is my point: it is as ridiculous to accuse someone of "lying" because they profess their innocence to another student as it is to do so when they do the same thing in the form of a "not guilty" plea in Judicial court.
The dilemma does not end here; there is also a structural problem. Take a hypothetical case: assume that a student was accused of a visitation violation, consistently maintained his innocence and then was charged with an Honor Code violation for professing his innocence. The problem is this: which adjudicating body would hear the case fist? Honor Council would be in a paradoxical position if it tried the case first, because the Council would be deciding on a judicial offense before Judicial Court had ruled on the matter. For it is impossible to separate the Honor and the Judicial accusations: The alleged lie was about the alleged visitation violation. It may be argued that the Honor Council is able to separate the two offenses and decide on the lie alone, but I do not see how this is possible. The accused claims that a certain judicial situation existed. The accuser claims that a different judicial situation existed, and that the accused is lying about that situation. Before deciding on the "lie," the Honor Council must first decide which judicial situation did in fact exist. And since judicial offenses do not fall within the scope of the Honor Code, the Honor Council would be put in the position of deciding on a matter outside of its jurisdiction prior to dealing with the alleged Honor Code infraction.
It could be argued that this problem should be solved in the following manner: let the case go to Judicial Court first and, if the accused is found guilty of the visitation violation, then let the question of the "lie" be heard by the Honor Council. This is not, however, a viable solution, because the proceedings and results of judicial trials are secret. It could be arranged for a transcript of the Judicial Trial to be given to Honor Court, this solution might work. But, no transcripts are made of judicial proceedings. And, further, assuming that some formal means could be devised of telling the Honor Council what the Judicial Court's verdict on the visitation matter was, what would the Council then do? Would it just be assumed by the Council that the Judicial verdict is correct? One would hope, not given the element of caprice and doubt present in any judicial proceeding.
More realistically, the Honor Council would, in effect, have to re-try the visitation case. This resurrects the jurisdictional problems mention earlier, along with a few more. First, there is the presence of double-jeopardy, a concept which is odius as well as illegal under the U.S. Constitution. In the hypothetical case mention earlier, the accused has already been tried and found guilty of a visitation violation. Now he is again being tried, only this time in Honor Court, for exactly the same offense. Second, what if the Honor Council, after hearing all the evidence relating to the visitation question, disagrees with the ruling of the Judicial Court and finds that the accused was in fact not guilty of the visitation offense? The accused would then have been found guilty by one court and innocent by another for the same offense. This possibility, in particular, brings the question of double jeopardy sharply into focus.
All of these problems could, of course, be solved if students accusing other students of judicial offenses would exercise a bit of discretion, by not putting the accused into a position in which it would be tempted to lie. This was exemplified in a case that recently came before the Honor Council. A student, seeing another student committing a visitation violation, asked her "did I just see you sneak a young man out of the locked doors?" The accused impulsively said "no," and the result was the Honor Trial. How much trouble would have been spared if only the accuser had said instead "I saw you sneaking a man out of the back door and hereby charge you with a judicial offense."
But, even in such cases as the one just mentioned, no Honor charges should ever have been brought. Anyone has the right to proclaim their innocence when accused of a rule violation; further, the present adjudication structure at MWC precludes the fair and legal disposition of cases such as the hypothetical visitation and Honor matter discussed earlier. For these reasons, students who "lie" about their innocence in judicial infractions ought not to be taken before the Honor Council. They are judicial matters to be decided to Judicial Court alone.
To try an individual for "lying" about whether or not they committed an infraction of the College rules is a denial of a fundamental judicial right: namely, the right to proclaim one's innocence in the face of an accusation. This right entails more than "pleading the fifth" and remaining silent in the face of charges. Surely all students, even though subsequently found guilty by the judicial system, are entitled to state their innocence. To believe otherwise is not only to deny a basic liberty; such as position also casts the entire concept of pleading "not guilty" in judicial court into a new light. For it implies that anyone who so pleads, and is subsequently found guilty by the court, is liable to charges of "lying" by originally pleading innocent. If it is a "lie" to tell another student that you are innocent of a judicial infraction when you are in fact guilty, does it not follow that you are equally guilty of "lying" when you do the same thing before the Judicial Court in the form of an "innocent" plea?
If this sounds absurd, that is my point: it is as ridiculous to accuse someone of "lying" because they profess their innocence to another student as it is to do so when they do the same thing in the form of a "not guilty" plea in Judicial court.
The dilemma does not end here; there is also a structural problem. Take a hypothetical case: assume that a student was accused of a visitation violation, consistently maintained his innocence and then was charged with an Honor Code violation for professing his innocence. The problem is this: which adjudicating body would hear the case fist? Honor Council would be in a paradoxical position if it tried the case first, because the Council would be deciding on a judicial offense before Judicial Court had ruled on the matter. For it is impossible to separate the Honor and the Judicial accusations: The alleged lie was about the alleged visitation violation. It may be argued that the Honor Council is able to separate the two offenses and decide on the lie alone, but I do not see how this is possible. The accused claims that a certain judicial situation existed. The accuser claims that a different judicial situation existed, and that the accused is lying about that situation. Before deciding on the "lie," the Honor Council must first decide which judicial situation did in fact exist. And since judicial offenses do not fall within the scope of the Honor Code, the Honor Council would be put in the position of deciding on a matter outside of its jurisdiction prior to dealing with the alleged Honor Code infraction.
It could be argued that this problem should be solved in the following manner: let the case go to Judicial Court first and, if the accused is found guilty of the visitation violation, then let the question of the "lie" be heard by the Honor Council. This is not, however, a viable solution, because the proceedings and results of judicial trials are secret. It could be arranged for a transcript of the Judicial Trial to be given to Honor Court, this solution might work. But, no transcripts are made of judicial proceedings. And, further, assuming that some formal means could be devised of telling the Honor Council what the Judicial Court's verdict on the visitation matter was, what would the Council then do? Would it just be assumed by the Council that the Judicial verdict is correct? One would hope, not given the element of caprice and doubt present in any judicial proceeding.
More realistically, the Honor Council would, in effect, have to re-try the visitation case. This resurrects the jurisdictional problems mention earlier, along with a few more. First, there is the presence of double-jeopardy, a concept which is odius as well as illegal under the U.S. Constitution. In the hypothetical case mention earlier, the accused has already been tried and found guilty of a visitation violation. Now he is again being tried, only this time in Honor Court, for exactly the same offense. Second, what if the Honor Council, after hearing all the evidence relating to the visitation question, disagrees with the ruling of the Judicial Court and finds that the accused was in fact not guilty of the visitation offense? The accused would then have been found guilty by one court and innocent by another for the same offense. This possibility, in particular, brings the question of double jeopardy sharply into focus.
All of these problems could, of course, be solved if students accusing other students of judicial offenses would exercise a bit of discretion, by not putting the accused into a position in which it would be tempted to lie. This was exemplified in a case that recently came before the Honor Council. A student, seeing another student committing a visitation violation, asked her "did I just see you sneak a young man out of the locked doors?" The accused impulsively said "no," and the result was the Honor Trial. How much trouble would have been spared if only the accuser had said instead "I saw you sneaking a man out of the back door and hereby charge you with a judicial offense."
But, even in such cases as the one just mentioned, no Honor charges should ever have been brought. Anyone has the right to proclaim their innocence when accused of a rule violation; further, the present adjudication structure at MWC precludes the fair and legal disposition of cases such as the hypothetical visitation and Honor matter discussed earlier. For these reasons, students who "lie" about their innocence in judicial infractions ought not to be taken before the Honor Council. They are judicial matters to be decided to Judicial Court alone.
Original Format
Newspaper
Contributor of the Digital Item
Tinter, Imani
Student Editor of the Digital Item
Williams, Megan
Files
Citation
Mello, Michael A., “Honor and Judicial: Where to Draw the Line,” HIST299, accessed July 12, 2026, https://hist299.umwhistory.org/items/show/70.