Lynch law justice
Dublin Core
Title
Lynch law justice
Subject
Lynch law
Capital punishment--United States--Periodicals
Jury selection--United States
Description
A magazine article that discusses the United States Supreme Court's decision on attorneys' usage of peremptory challenges for minority jurors when the defendant is also a minority.
Source
Guardian (New York)
Publisher
HIST 298, University of Mary Washington
Date
1986-05-14
Rights
The materials in this online collection are held by Special Collections, Simpson Library, University of Mary Washington and are available for educational use. For this purpose only, you may reproduce materials without prior permission on the condition that you provide attribution of the source.
Format
1 JPG
300 DPI
Language
English
Coverage
United States
Text Item Type Metadata
Text
[image - Supreme Court political cartoon drawing]
Some people say the composition of the Supreme Court defies political labels. But those who oppose the death penalty are not among that number, and a recent decision that allows prosecutors to exclude capital punishment abolitionists is confirmation that the justices are primarily a conservative lot. The court’s decisions and its logic are riddled with contradictions. Justice Thurgood Marshall, the only Black member on the court and the most consistent, said the death penalty ruling gives “the prosecution license to empanel a jury” to virtually insure a guilty verdict. Marshall was joined by Justices William Brennan and John Paul Stevens in dissenting from the 6-3 majority decision. “Because I believe that such a blatant disregard for the rights of a capital defendant offends logic, fairness and the Constitution, I dissent,” Marshall wrote. He added that “the court upholds a practice that allows the state a special advantage in those prosecutions where the charges are the most serious and the possible punishments the most severe.” On April 30, one week earlier, the court handed down three important decisions regarding criminal prosecution. In one instance, which has been praised as a step forward by civil rights organizations, the justices rightly ruled that prosecutors cannot exclude Blacks from juries on the basis of race. The decision limits the use of peremptory challenges, which in the past could not be questioned. Now a minority defendant may object to such a challenge, and the prosecutor has the burden of convincing the judge that the challenge is not racially motivated. Though Marshall agreed that the ruling is a “historic step toward eliminating the shameful practice of racial discrimination in the selection of juries, it did not go far enough.” Once challenged, contended Marshall, “any prosecutor can easily assert . . . neutral reasons for striking a juror, and trial courts are ill-equipped to second-guess those reasons.” It is well known that district attorneys have abused peremptory challenges to stack juries, so that Black defendants are usually judged by all-white panels. “The misuse of peremptories has become the standard method for excluding Blacks from jury service,” said Steve Ralston of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. “The problem is nationwide in scope,” he added. But, as Marshall pointed out, the ruling should have been stronger. Instead, the decision exemplifies the half-hearted fairness that represents the best we can expect from the current majority. On the other hand, while the court is open to some long overdue concessions in the racially biased structure of the trial system, there is a deeply ingrained hostility against death-row prisoners. “Most disturbing,” says Mike Mello of Florida’s Capital Collateral Representatives, “was the tone of the ruling and the cavalier way the court approached the situation. It was another example of the court’s unwillingness to consider any systematic assault on the death penalty,” concludes Mello, who is an attorney for many of the state’s 200 prisoners on death row. At one time a trial judge could exclude anyone who happened to express the mildest reservation concerning the death penalty. But in 1968 the court ruled that only those who refused to vote for a death sentence were to be excluded—not from participating in the trial, only in the process of passing sentence. Now, any prospective juror who is against the death penalty can be barred from a capital case. “It is outrageous,” declared Henry Schwartzchild, director of the American Civil Liberties Union’s Capital Punishment Project. Mello said the decision forces attorneys for death-row prisoners into mainly “rearguard challenges.” “We are forced to avoid anything,” Mello told the Guardian, “that raises general issues and simply deal on a case-by-case basis.” As a consequence, most of the 1750 prisoners currently on death row have lost virtually all grounds for appealing their sentences. And that means the rate of executions will pick up sharply. In addition, we can expect a lot more convictions with death sentences, as prosecutors are given a freer hand to pick jurors predisposed to that outcome. That’s not justice—that’s lynch law.
Some people say the composition of the Supreme Court defies political labels. But those who oppose the death penalty are not among that number, and a recent decision that allows prosecutors to exclude capital punishment abolitionists is confirmation that the justices are primarily a conservative lot. The court’s decisions and its logic are riddled with contradictions. Justice Thurgood Marshall, the only Black member on the court and the most consistent, said the death penalty ruling gives “the prosecution license to empanel a jury” to virtually insure a guilty verdict. Marshall was joined by Justices William Brennan and John Paul Stevens in dissenting from the 6-3 majority decision. “Because I believe that such a blatant disregard for the rights of a capital defendant offends logic, fairness and the Constitution, I dissent,” Marshall wrote. He added that “the court upholds a practice that allows the state a special advantage in those prosecutions where the charges are the most serious and the possible punishments the most severe.” On April 30, one week earlier, the court handed down three important decisions regarding criminal prosecution. In one instance, which has been praised as a step forward by civil rights organizations, the justices rightly ruled that prosecutors cannot exclude Blacks from juries on the basis of race. The decision limits the use of peremptory challenges, which in the past could not be questioned. Now a minority defendant may object to such a challenge, and the prosecutor has the burden of convincing the judge that the challenge is not racially motivated. Though Marshall agreed that the ruling is a “historic step toward eliminating the shameful practice of racial discrimination in the selection of juries, it did not go far enough.” Once challenged, contended Marshall, “any prosecutor can easily assert . . . neutral reasons for striking a juror, and trial courts are ill-equipped to second-guess those reasons.” It is well known that district attorneys have abused peremptory challenges to stack juries, so that Black defendants are usually judged by all-white panels. “The misuse of peremptories has become the standard method for excluding Blacks from jury service,” said Steve Ralston of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. “The problem is nationwide in scope,” he added. But, as Marshall pointed out, the ruling should have been stronger. Instead, the decision exemplifies the half-hearted fairness that represents the best we can expect from the current majority. On the other hand, while the court is open to some long overdue concessions in the racially biased structure of the trial system, there is a deeply ingrained hostility against death-row prisoners. “Most disturbing,” says Mike Mello of Florida’s Capital Collateral Representatives, “was the tone of the ruling and the cavalier way the court approached the situation. It was another example of the court’s unwillingness to consider any systematic assault on the death penalty,” concludes Mello, who is an attorney for many of the state’s 200 prisoners on death row. At one time a trial judge could exclude anyone who happened to express the mildest reservation concerning the death penalty. But in 1968 the court ruled that only those who refused to vote for a death sentence were to be excluded—not from participating in the trial, only in the process of passing sentence. Now, any prospective juror who is against the death penalty can be barred from a capital case. “It is outrageous,” declared Henry Schwartzchild, director of the American Civil Liberties Union’s Capital Punishment Project. Mello said the decision forces attorneys for death-row prisoners into mainly “rearguard challenges.” “We are forced to avoid anything,” Mello told the Guardian, “that raises general issues and simply deal on a case-by-case basis.” As a consequence, most of the 1750 prisoners currently on death row have lost virtually all grounds for appealing their sentences. And that means the rate of executions will pick up sharply. In addition, we can expect a lot more convictions with death sentences, as prosecutors are given a freer hand to pick jurors predisposed to that outcome. That’s not justice—that’s lynch law.
Original Format
Magazine
Contributor of the Digital Item
Reschke, Daniel
Student Editor of the Digital Item
Dickinson, Terra
Files
Citation
“Lynch law justice,” HIST299, accessed March 12, 2026, https://hist299.umwhistory.org/items/show/108.